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welfare and thus total welfare. We extend the results to an oligopoly model with di¤eren-
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I. INTRODUCTION
One central question in economics of innovation is how to provide the appropriate incen-
tives for rms to conduct innovation. Product liability plays an important role in inuenc-
ing rms innovation decisions. For example, toy manufacturers may be concerned about
whether their products with newly incorporated functions would cause harm to children,
and pharmaceutical producers may be afraid of unknown side e¤ects for recently developed
drugs. As the harm done to consumers may result in court litigation, which could cost mil-
lions of dollars, producers may hesitate to launch innovative products if the product liability
is high. In fact, in a survey conducted by Mcguire (1988), more than a third of surveyed
CEOs reported that product liability had a major e¤ect on their business, and a small share
reported abandoning a new product because of liability fears. In addition to the concern of
inventing unsafe products, rms may want to improve the safety of their existing products
to avoid potential litigation in court. A case in point is the recent accident involving the
explosion of a Samsung Note 7. The lawsuits it may cause highlight the potential monetary
loss and reputation damage done to innovating rms under product liability. According to
Polinsky and Shavell (2010), in the United States, tens of thousands of product liability
cases are led annually in court.
This paper aims to study the e¤ect of product liability in economic environments where
rms behave strategically when conducting product innovations. In particular, we rst
consider a monopoly model in which a rm chooses both product novelty and safety in
an innovation stage followed by a production stage. Our framework captures the rms
interdependent choices of product novelty and safety which inuence consumer demand
and determine R&D costs. In the model, a greater product liability directly increases the
marginal benet of inventing a safer product and thus increases product safety. However,
the e¤ect on product novelty is more subtle. On the one hand, there is a demand-shifting
e¤ect : an increase in product safety induces a higher consumer demand, which provides
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incentives for the rm to increase product novelty. On the other hand, there is a cross-
R&D e¤ect : a higher product safety may increase or decrease the marginal R&D cost of
product novelty. The overall e¤ect of product liability on product novelty depends on the
relative strengths of these two e¤ects. One nding from the model is that both product
novelty and safety increase with product liability when their R&D costs are independent.
This result contrasts with those of Viscusi and Moore (1993), who nd that product liability
has no e¤ect on product and safety innovation if the R&D costs are independent.
Interestingly, we show that an increase in product liability that seems to protect con-
sumers may actually lead to lower consumer welfare. This arises when the negative cross-
R&D e¤ect is relatively large, in which case the rm optimally raises the product safety
but lowers the product novelty. The reduced product novelty negatively a¤ects consumer
welfare to the extent that it dominates the consumer benet of increased product safety.
Consequently, a higher product liability may result in lower consumer welfare and thus
lower total welfare.
We extend the model to an oligopoly case where n symmetric rms rst simultaneously
choose product novelty and safety, and then compete in a product market. We show that the
results in the monopoly model can be readily extended to the competitive setting. We also
study the e¤ect of competition, which is measured, respectively, by the number of rms and
degree of product substitutability. We show that equilibrium product novelty and safety
decrease as the number of rms increases. This is because an increase in the number of
rms reduces the equilibrium output for each rm and thus leads to a lower equilibrium
product novelty and safety. However, as the degree of product substitutability increases,
equilibrium product novelty and safety decrease initially and then increase. Two forces are
behind this non-monotonic pattern. First, closer substitutes lead to a lower equilibrium
output, resulting in a lower product novelty and safety due to a weakened demand-shifting
e¤ect. Second, the reduced product di¤erentiation provides a higher incentive for rms to
invest in product novelty. Furthermore, we show that product liability and competition
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measured by the number of rms are substitutes in the promotion of product and safety
innovation, while an increase in product substitutability may strengthen or weaken the
e¤ects of product liability on product novelty and safety innovation.
The existing literature of product liability and innovation incentive has focused on the
pure incentive of product innovation.1 A dominant view is that greater product liability
deters product innovation because it reduces prots from innovation and thus the likeli-
hood of introducing new products (Porter 1980). Several recent papers have studied issues
related to product safety. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) study the choice of R&D in-
vestment safety under various liability systems. Chen and Hua (2012) examine the e¤ects
of product liability on ex ante safety investment and possible ex post remedy. Daughety
and Reinganum (2006) compare the market equilibrium safety e¤ort and output levels to
what a planner would choose. Baumann and Heine (2013) consider the role of product
liability in innovation when rms face competitive pressure and nd that compared with
social optimum, competition forces innovating rms to introduce new products too early.
Chen and Hua (2017) investigate whether competition can substitute for product liability
in motivating rms to improve product safety. However, none of these studies considers the
e¤ect of product liability on rms joint decision on product novelty and safety as we do in
this paper.2
Our paper closely relates to Viscusi and Moore (1993) in which a reduced form model
is developed to study the e¤ect of product liability on both safety and product innovation.
Di¤erently, we develop a game theoretical model under monopoly and oligopoly situations
in which rms make strategic decisions. Consequently, compared with Viscusi and Moore,
we obtain di¤erent results (in the monopoly model) and new insights (in the competition
setting). For example, we show that both product novelty and safety increase with product
1See Daughety and Reinganum (2013) for a survey on recent theoretical economic analysis of product
liability. Studies have examined alternative protections for consumers under product failure (e.g., product
warranties (Cooper and Ross, 1985) and product recall (Hua, 2011).)
2Chen (2001) develops a green product model in which the monopoly rm chooses both traditional and
environmental attributes for its products to satisfy di¤erent segments of consumers.
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liability, whereas Viscusi and Moore nd that product liability has no e¤ect on product
and safety innovation if their R&D costs are independent. Moreover, we study the e¤ect of
competition, whereas Viscusi and Moore merely consider the case of a monopoly rm.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We present a monopoly model and illustrate
its economic forces in Section 2. We extend the model to an oligopoly setting and study the
e¤ect of competition in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs are regulated
in the Appendix A.
II. A MONOPOLY MODEL
In this section, we study a monopoly model to illustrate the economic forces in a trans-
parent way. In the next section, we consider the case of competition.
The setup
Consider a case where a monopoly rm conducts product innovation and invents a new
product that has two dimensions: a level of product novelty,   0; and a degree of safety,
0  s  1. A representative risk-neutral consumer derives utility from the new product,
U (q) = A () q  
1
2
q2;
where q is the consumed quantity. We assume that consumer utility increases at a decreasing
rate as product novelty increases: @A=@ > 0 and @2A=@2  0.
The new product entails a safety risk that may cause harm to the consumer. In particular,
with a probability s; the new product is dysfunctional and the consumer su¤ers a damage
 from product failure. In many cases, the rm bears only partial responsibility because it
may be di¢cult to verify the cause of product failure. Even if the rm is fully responsible for
the damage, the consumer may still incur an uncompensated loss (settlement bargaining,
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litigation cost, etc.), which is denoted as ' (s; ) (Daughety and Reinganum, 2006). We
assume that the uncompensated loss increases with ; @'=@ > 0; and is a decreasing,
convex function of product safety, @'=@s < 0 and @2'=@s2  0. Hence, the consumer
maximizes
A () q  
1
2
q2 + y   pq   ' (s; ) q; (1)
where p is the price and y is the income. We can derive the inverse demand function as
p = A ()  q   ' (s; ) : (2)
The product innovation is costly. Specically, the cost of inventing the new product
with a level of novelty  and a degree of safety s is x (; s) with @x=@ > 0, @x=@s > 0;
@2x=@2 > 0 and @2x=@s2 > 0:3 With a probability 1  s; the product is not safe and may
cause damage to the consumer. In this case, the rm is demanded to pay a ne L: In our
paper, a higher L means a higher product liability.4 We assume that once the product is
invented, it can be produced at a constant marginal cost c:
The timing is as follows. First, the degree of product liability, L; is determined. Second,
the rm chooses a product novelty, ; and a degree of safety, s. Third, the rm decides the
quantity of output, q. Fourth, with a probability 1   s, the product is not safe, the rm
pays L.
The analysis
We solve the model by backward induction. Consider the choice of output quantity, q;
given product novelty, ; and safety, s. The rm chooses q to maximize prot,
 = (p  c) q   (1  s)L  x (; s) :
3Note that @2x=@@s can be positive, negative or zero.
4 In Appendix B, we consider the case in which product liability depends on quantity sold and show that
main insights continue to hold.
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From (2), the prot-maximizing quantity satises
q =
A ()  ' (s; )  c
2
: (3)
Next, we consider the choices of product novelty and safety. From (3), we can rewrite the
prot function as
 =

A ()  ' (s; )  c
2
2
  (1  s)L  x (; s) : (4)
The rst-order conditions of (4) with respect to  and s; respectively, yield
[A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@A
@
  2
@x
@
= 0 (5)
and
  [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@'
@s
+ 2L  2
@x
@s
= 0: (6)
The second-order conditions, which we assume to hold, are

@A
@
2
+[A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2A
@2
 2
@2x
@2
< 0 ;

@'
@s
2
 [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2'
@s2
 2
@2x
@s2
< 0
(7)
and
 =
(
@A
@
2
+ [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2A
@2
  2
@2x
@2
)(
@'
@s
2
  [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2
@s2
  2
@2x
@s2
)
 

@A
@
@'
@s
+ 2
@2x
@@s
2
> 0: (8)
We are now in a position to examine the e¤ect of higher liability on product and safety
innovations. Considering the total di¤erentiations of (5) and (6) with respect to L, with
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rearrangements and by Cramers rule, we have5
@s
@L
=  
2

(
@A
@
2
+ [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2A
@2
  2
@2x
@2
)
(9)
and
@
@L
=  
2


@A
@
@'
@s
+ 2
@2x
@@s

: (10)
From (7) and (8), we have @s
@L
> 0: Moreover, @
@L
R 0 if  R 0; where
 =  
1
2
@A
@
@'
@s
 
@2x
@@s
: (11)
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that (; s) ; which are interior solutions to (5) and (6), exist.
(i) s increases in L; and (ii)  increases (decreases) in L if  > (<)0: Moreover, if
@2x=@@s = 0; then both s and  increase in L:
A higher L directly increases the marginal benet of improving product safety, as a safer
product reduces the probability for the rm to pay L. Moreover, a higher product safety
increases consumers willingness to pay. The increased willingness to pay a¤ects the rms
price and quantity and thus provides further incentive to increase product safety. We term
this the demand-shifting e¤ect. The e¤ect of L on product novelty is more subtle. Although
an increase in L does not directly a¤ect the choice of product novelty, it has two indirect
e¤ects. First, there is the cross-R&D e¤ect on the R&D production side in the sense that a
higher product safety may increase or decrease the marginal R&D cost of product novelty,
which is represented by the last term in (11). In particular, if this cross-R&D e¤ect is
positive and signicant, the rm has a strong incentive to lower the product novelty when
the product safety increases. Second, as in product safety, there is the demand-shifting
5Derivations are shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.
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e¤ect. In particular, an increase in s leads to a higher willingness to pay, which inuences
the rms price and quantity strategies and thus the marginal prot of increasing product
novelty.6 The demand-shifting and cross-R&D e¤ects jointly determine the overall impact
of L on equilibrium product novelty.
It is also worthy of pointing out that in our model, both equilibrium product novelty
and safety increase in product liability if the cross-R&D cost e¤ect is neutral. This result
contrasts with those of Viscusi and Moore (1993), who conclude, "If there is no interaction
between safety and novelty in the input requirement function    higher liability costs will
a¤ect safety investments but not product novelty." (page 167). Here, we go beyond Viscusi
and Moore (1993) to consider a game-theorectical framework where consumers demands on
product novelty and safety are interdependent and thus a change in product liability a¤ects
both equilibrium product safety and novelty. With the absence of a cross-R&D e¤ect, a
higher L increases product novelty through the positive demand-shifting e¤ect in our model.
To obtain further results, we consider the following linear demand and quadratic R&D
cost specications: (i) the product value consists of an (exogenous) essential value and a
variable value that can be improved by the rm at a cost; (ii) the expected uncompensated
damage is linear in product safety s; and (iii) the R&D cost is quadratic. In particular, we
assume that
A () = 0 + ; ' (s; ) = (1  s) ; (12)
where 0 is the (exogenous) essential value of the product and
x (; s) =
1
2
2 +
1
2
s2 + s;  > 0;  > 0; (13)
where  and  are the cost coe¢cients of product novelty and safety, respectively, and
@2x=@@s =  captures the cross-R&D cost e¤ect. Note that under (12) and (13), (8) is
6To see this, note that from (2) and (3), 1
2
@A
@
=  
@p
@
: Thus, the rst term in (11) can be rewritten as
@p
@
@'
@s
; which represents the e¤ect of s on the marginal e¤ect of  on monopoly price.
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equivalent to

2
 
s
2
2
  

1
2
  

<  <

2
+
s
2
2
  

1
2
  

: (14)
Moreover, from (11), we can calculate  = 2 : From Proposition 1, we immediately have
the following result.
Corollary 1 Under (12) and (13), (i) if 2  
r
2
2   
  
1
2   

<   2 ; then
@s
@L
 0
and @
@L
 0; and (ii) if 2 <  <

2 +
r
2
2   
  
1
2   

; then @s
@L
> 0 and @
@L
< 0.
The overall e¤ect of product liability on product novelty depends on the relative strengths
of the demand-shifting and cross-R&D cost e¤ects. When  is small, the cross-R&D cost
e¤ect is relatively less signicant. Thus, the positive demand-shifting e¤ect dominates, and
consequently a higher L increases both s and . When  is large, the negative cross-R&D
cost e¤ect outweights the demand-shifting e¤ect. As a result, an increase in L causes  to
decline.
How does consumer welfare change with product liability? In Proposition 1, we show
that as product liability increases, product safety increases. However, the rm may choose
a higher or a lower product novelty. Hence, consumers can be worse o¤ because of a possibly
lower product novelty even if they benet from a safer product. Thus, it is not clear ex-ante
whether a higher product liability always benets consumers or not. Next, we address this
question.
Under quansi-linear consumer utility, the consumer welfare can be calculated from (1),
where q takes the value of equilibrium output quantity. Using (2), we can show that
consumer welfare is
CS =
1
2

A ()  ' (s; )  c
2
2
+ y:
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Thus,
dCS
dL
=
1
2
q

@A
@
@
@L
 
@'
@s
@s
@L

: (15)
In general, the e¤ect of product liability on consumer welfare depends on the sign of @
@L
;
noting that @'
@s
is negative and @s
@L
is positive. However, when there is no cross-R&D e¤ect
between product novelty and safety, from Proposition 1, an increase in product liability
always leads to a higher product novelty and thus a higher consumer welfare. Under the
linear consumer demand and quadratic R&D cost, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Under (12) and (13), consumer and total welfare increase (decrease) with
product liability if  < (>):
Interestingly, a higher product liability may actually harm consumers. The intuition is
as follows. If the cross-R&D e¤ect captured by  is large, the rm optimally raises the
product safety but lowers the product novelty. The reduced product novelty negatively
a¤ects consumers to the extent that it dominates the consumer benet of increased product
safety. Consequently, the higher liability for the rm that seems to protect consumers may
actually harm them. Moreover, by envelop theorem, we have @
@L
=   (1  s) : Thus, the sum
of the rms prot and its expected forfeited ne (1  s)L is unchanged with L: Therefore,
total welfare increases (decreases) with  if  < (>):
III. AN OLIGOPOLY MODEL AND COMPETITION
In this section, we develop an oligopoly model with product di¤erentiation and extend
the results in the previous section to the oligopoly model. We also study how competition,
measured by the number of rms and product substitutability, respectively, a¤ects the
market equilibrium.
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The setup and its equilibrium
There are n symmetric rms in the market, where rm i; i = 1; :::; n; can choose two
dimensions for its product, a level of product novelty, i  0; and a degree of safety,
0  si  1. We assume that the inverse demand function is
pi = A (i)  qi   ' (si; )  q i;
where q i is the total output excluding qi and  2 (0; 1) captures the degree of substi-
tutability among products.7 Note that in a symmetric case where i =  and si = s, for all
i; the preceding demand functions reduce to those that are commonly used in the literature
(Dixit, 1979). The cost of inventing a product with (i; si) for rm i is denoted as x (i; si) :
Moreover, these costs are assumed i.i.d. among rms. The marginal cost of production is c
once a product is invented:
The timing is stated as follows. First, the degree of product liability, L; is announced.
Second, each rm decides product novelty and degree of safety. Third, after observing other
rms choices of product novelty and safety, each rm chooses its product quantity. Firms
compete with each other in the output market. Fourth, in the case of product failure, the
producer pays L.
Again, we solve the oligopoly model by backward induction. In particular, we rst derive
the optimal choice of output quantity given product novelty and safety and then characterize
the optimal product novelty and safety in the symmetric equilibrium, where each rm
chooses the same  and s. In Appendix A, we show the following result.
Proposition 3 In the oligopoly model, suppose a symmetric equilibrium exists such that
7One can also derive this inverse demand function from a micro-foundation similar to that in the monopoly
model in Section II.
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each rm chooses (; s). (i) s increases in L and (ii)  increases (decreases) in L if
 =  (n; )

 
@'
@s
@A
@

 
@2x
@@s
> (<)0; (16)
where
 (n; ) =
2 [2 + (n  2) ]
(2  ) [2 + (n  1) ]2
: (17)
As in the monopoly case, a higher L induces a higher equilibrium product safety by
increasing its marginal benet. The e¤ect of L on product novelty is subject to demand-
shifting and cross-R&D cost e¤ects. The overall e¤ect of L on product novelty depends on
specic forms of utility and cost functions. It is worthy of noticing that the introduction of
an oligopoly model with product di¤erentiation alters the magnitude of the two e¤ects and
thus the total e¤ect on product novelty and safety. We address this issue in detail in the
next subsection.
Suppose further that
A (i) = 0 + i; ' (s; ) = (1  si)  (18)
and
x (i; si) =
1
2
2i +
1
2
s2i + isi: (19)
Under (18) and (19), the e¤ects of product liability are
@s
@L
=  
 (n; )  
 (n; ) 2   

[ (n; )  ]  [ (n; )    ]2
(20)
and
@
@L
=
 (n; )    
 (n; ) 2   

[ (n; )  ]  [ (n; )    ]2
: (21)
The next corollary immediately follows from Proposition 2.
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Corollary 2 In a symmetric equilibrium under specications (18) and (19), (i) if   ;
then @s
@L
 0 and @
@L
 0; and (ii) if  > ; then @s
@L
> 0 and @
@L
< 0.
Corollary 2 is a parallel result of Corollary 1. In the oligopoly model, when  is relatively
small (  ), the positive demand-shifting e¤ect is more prominent, and thus a higher
L increases . However, when  is relatively large ( > ); the negative cross-R&D cost
e¤ect dominates, and as a result,  decreases as L increases.
The e¤ect of competition
We next consider the e¤ect of competition. In particular, we measure an increase in
competition by (a) an increase in the number of rms, n; and (b) an increase in product
substitutability, : To better illustrate the e¤ect of competition, we focus on the case where
both product novelty and safety increase with product liability. In particular, we assume
   such that, from Corollary 2, @s
@L
 0 and @
@L
 0:
We establish some useful results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) As n increases,  decreases; and (ii) as  increases,  rst decreases and
then increases.
We are now in a position to study the e¤ect of competition. We show in Appendix A,
that
@
@
=
[0 +    (1  s)    c] (   )
(   )
 
2   

  (   )2
(22)
and
@s
@
=
[0 +    (1  s)    c] (   )
(   )
 
2   

  (   )2
: (23)
Utilizing Lemma 1, we have the following results.
Proposition 4 (i) As n increases,  and s decrease; and (ii) as  increases,  and s
decrease initially and then increase.
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An increase in the number of rms reduces the equilibrium output for each rm. This
in turn weakens the demand-shifting e¤ect and thus leads to a lower equilibrium product
novelty and safety. As products become more substitutable, equilibrium product novelty
and safety are subjected to two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, the equilibrium output
is lower for a smaller . This results in a lower product novelty and safety due to a weaker
demand-shifting e¤ect. On the other hand, the reduced (horizontal) product di¤erentiation
provides a higher incentive for rms to invest in the vertical aspects of a product. Con-
sequently, an decrease in  may increase product novelty and safety. In our model, if  is
relatively small, the rst force dominates, and thus the equilibrium product novelty and
safety increases with : If  is relatively large, the second force is more prominent, and thus
the equilibrium product novelty and safety decreases with :
We next consider how a change in competition inuences the e¤ects of product liability
on product novelty and safety. From (20) and (21), we can show that
@
 
@s
@L

@
=
(   )2 
2   2 + 2    + 
2 > 0 (24)
and
@

@
@L

@
=
(   ) (   ) 
2   2 + 2    + 
2 > 0 (25)
noticing that  < min f=; g ; which is implied by the second-order conditions to guar-
antee the interior solutions. From Lemma 1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) As n increases, the marginal e¤ects of product liability on product nov-
elty and safety decrease; and (ii) as  increases, the marginal e¤ect of product liability on
product novelty and safety decrease initially and then increase.
Proposition 5 indicates that product liability and competition measured by the number
of rms are substitutes in the promotion of product and safety innovation. This is because
an increase in the number of rms weakens the demand-shifting e¤ect and thus reduces the
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e¤ect of product liability on product and safety innovations. Proposition 5 also suggests
that an increase in product substitutability may strengthen or weaken the e¤ect of product
liability on product and safety innovations. In particular, when products are relatively more
independent, an increase in product substitutability lowers the e¤ectiveness of product
liability on innovations. In contrast, when products are close substitutes, an increase in
product substitutability raises the e¤ectiveness of product liability on innovations.
CONCLUSION
We have developed theoretical models to study the e¤ects of product liability on the
incentive of product innovation. In our models, rms optimally choose product novelty
and safety while considering the e¤ects on both consumer demand and joint R&D costs. A
greater product liability directly increases the marginal benet of producing a safer product
and thus increases product safety. However, a greater product liability may increase or
decrease product novelty, depending on the relative strengths of the demand-shifting and
cross-R&D e¤ects.
Our paper o¤ers new insights into the literature, provides empirically testable results
and draws important policy implications. First, in a well-cited paper, Viscusi and Moore
(1993) conclude that product liability has no e¤ect on product and safety innovation if
the R&D costs are independent. In contrast, by explicitly modeling the strategic e¤ect on
consumer demand, which is absent in the reduced form model of Viscusi and Moore, we show
that under independent R&D costs, both product novelty and safety increase with product
liability. Second, we nd that if the cross-R&D e¤ect is relatively large, a greater product
liability may lead to lower consumer and total welfare. Thus, policy-makers should be
cautious in reforming product liability law by lifting up product liability. Finally, we show
that an increase in competition among rms can have complex e¤ects on the incentives
of product innovation. In particular, product liability and competition measured by the
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number of rms are substitutes in the promotion of product and safety innovation, while an
increase in product substitutability may strengthen or weaken the e¤ect of product liability
on product and safety innovation. Future research that empirically tests the relationship
between product liability and competition in the promotion of innovations is desirable.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1.
Total di¤erentiations of (5) and (6) with respect to L give

@A
@
@
@L
 
@'
@s
@s
@L

@A
@
+ [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2A
@2
@
@L
  2

@2x
@2
@
@L
+
@2x
@@s
@s
@L

= 0
and
 

@A
@
@
@L
 
@'
@s
@s
@L

@'
@s
+[A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2'
@s2
@s
@L
+2 2

@2x
@s@
@
@L
+
@2x
@s2
@s
@L

= 0:
With rearrangement, we can further show that
(
@A
@
2
+ [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2A
@2
  2
@2x
@2
)
@
@L
+

 
@'
@s
@A
@
  2
@2x
@@s

@s
@L
= 0
and

 
@A
@
@'
@s
  2
@2x
@s@

@
@L
+
(
@'
@s
2
+ [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@2'
@s2
  2
@2x
@s2
)
@s
@L
=  2:
Thus, applying Cramers rule, we can solve @
@L
and @s
@L
; and obtain expressions as in (9) and
(10). From (7) and (8), we have @s
@L
> 0: Moreover, @
@L
R 0 if  R 0: Finally, if @
2x
@@s
= 0;
 > 0 and thus @
@L
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 2.
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Note that
dCS
dL
=
1
2
q

@A
@
@
@L
 
@'
@s
@s
@L

:
Under the linear consumer demand and quadratic R&D cost, we have
dCS
dL
=

1
2
q

 
2


[(  + 2)  ( ) (1  2)]
=

1
2
q

 
2


(2   2) :
Thus, dCS
dL
> (<)0 if  < (>): Moreover, by envelop theorem, we have
@
@L
=   (1  s) :
Therefore, for TS = CS +  + (1  s)L; it increases (decreases) with  if  < (>):
Proof of Proposition 3.
We rst consider the choice of output quantity, qi; given product novelty, i and j ; and
safety level, si and sj . Firm i maximizes prot,
i = (pi   c) qi   (1  si)L  x (i; si) :
First order condition, @i
@qi
= 0; implies
qi =
A (i)  ' (si; )  c 

2+(n 1)
n
j=1

A
 
j

  ' (sj ; )  c

(2  )
:
Next, we consider the choice of product novelty and safety. Note that the prot can be
written as
i = (qi)
2   (1  si)L  x (i; si) :
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First order conditions with respect to si and i; respectively, yield
@i
@si
= 2qi
@qi
@si
+ L 
@x
@si
= 2qi
2 + (n  2) 
(2  ) [2 + (n  1) ]

 
@'
@si

+ L 
@x
@si
= 0
and
@i
@i
= 2qi
@qi
@i
 
@xi
@i
= 2qi
2 + (n  2) 
(2  ) [(2 + (n  1) )]
@A
@i
 
@x
@i
= 0: (26)
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which each rm chooses product novelty ;
safety s and output q: It follows that
q =
A ()  ' (s; )  c
2 +  (n  1)
: (27)
Thus,
@
@
=  [A ()  ' (s; )  c]
@A
@
 
@x
@
= 0 (28)
and
@
@s
=  [A ()  ' (s; )  c]

 
@'
@s

+ L 
@x
@s
= 0 (29)
where
 =
2 [2 + (n  2) ]
(2  ) [2 + (n  1) ]2
:
Note that second order conditions, which we assume to hold, are

"
@
@
2
+ ( (; s)  c)
@2
@2
#
 
@2x
@2
< 0; 
"
@
@s
2
+ [ (; s)  c]
@2
@s2
#
 
@2x
@s2
< 0
(30)
and
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"

 
@
@s
2
+ ( (; s)  c)
@2
@s2
!
 
@2x
@s2
#"

 
@
@
2
+ ( (; s)  c)
@2
@2
!
 
@2x
@2
#
 



@
@
@
@s
+ ( (; s)  c)
@2
@s@

 
@2x
@s@
2
> 0: (31)
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Total di¤erentiation of (28) and (29) with respect to L; with rearrangement, yield,
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
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2
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
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@s
@L
= 0
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

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@'
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
 
@2x
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+
"

 
@'
@s
2
+ [A ()  ' (s; )  c]

 
@2'
@s2
!
 
@2x
@s2
#
@s
@L
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Therefore, we have
@s
@L
=  
1


"

 
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2
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)  ' (s; )  c]
@2A
@2
!
 
@2x
@2
#
(32)
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@
@L
=
1





 
@'
@s
@A
@

 
@2x
@@s

: (33)
From (30) and (31), we have @s
@L
> 0: Moreover, @
@L
R 0 if  R 0 where
 = 

 
@'
@s
@A
@

 
@2x
@@s
:
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) From (17),
@
@n
=  
2 [(n  3)  + 2]
(2  ) [(n  1)  + 2]3
< 0 (34)
for  2 (0; 1):
(ii) Note that
@
@
=
4 (n  1)
(   2)2 [(n  1)  + 2]3
 (; n) (35)
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where  (; n) = (n  2) 2 + (5  n)    2: Hence,
sign

@
@

= sign ( (; n)) :
Moreover,  (; n) < 0 if  = 0 and  (; n) > 0 if  = 1: It follows that there exists a unique
^ > 0 such that @
@
< 0 for  2 (0; ^] and @
@
> 0 for  2 (^; 1):
Proof of Proposition 4.
In the symmetric equilibrium, product novelty and safety are given by (28) and (29).
Total di¤erentiations of (28) and (29) with respect to ; with rearrangement, give
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where
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:
Under the specications, (36) and (37) become
@
@
=
[A ()  ' (s; )  c] (   )
(   )
 
2   

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and
@s
@
=
[A ()  ' (s; )  c] (   )
(   )
 
2   

  (   )2
:
From (31), (   )
 
2   

  (   )2 > 0: Moreover, from (30),  < min

=2; 
	
:
Thus, together with the assumption   ; we have  < min f=; g : Hence, by Lemma
1, results in Proposition 4 follow.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix, we consider a variant of our main model in which a monopoly rms
liability is linear in quantity sold. Compared to the main model, there will be an additional
quantity e¤ect in the variant considered here because product quantity will depend on
liability. The analysis will become more complicated. Nevertheless, we will show that
the main insight that a higher product liability may induce a lower product novelty and
consequently, lead to a lower consumer welfare will continue to hold under some parameter
regions.
The setup is the same as in the main model except that liability L is equal to lq where
l measures the strength of liability.8 The following analysis is similar to that in the main
model. In particular, the rm chooses q to maximize prot,
 = (p  c) q   (1  s) lq   x (; s) :
The resulting prot-maximizing quantity is
q =
A ()  ' (s; )  c  (1  s) l
2
:
8Daughety and Reinganum (2006) adopt a similar setting to analyze the e¤ect of market and legal
incentives on the level of safety e¤ort as well as the level of output.
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and thus we can rewrite the prot function as
 = [q (; s; l)]2   x (; s) : (38)
The rst-order conditions of (38) with respect to  and s; respectively, yield
q
@A
@
 
@x
@
= 0 (39)
and
q

 
@'
@s
+ l

 
@x
@s
= 0: (40)
To conduct tractable analysis, we focus on the case with linear demand and quadratic
cost function as considered in Corollary 1. In particular, from the total di¤erentiations of
(39) and (40) with respect to l; we can obtain that
@s
@l
=
1


 
1
2

q  
(1  s)
2
( + l)

+
(1  s)
2

  
1
2
( + l)

(41)
and
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@l
=
1


(1  s)
2

1
2
( + l)2   

 

1
2
( + l)  
 
(1  s)
2
( + l)  q

(42)
with
 =

1
2
  
 
1
2
( + l)2   

 

  
1
2
( + l)
2
:
Moreover, assuming  and s are interior solution, we have, from the second-order condition,
 > 12 ,  >
1
2 ( + l)
2 and  > 0:
Next, we can show that consumer welfare is
CS =
1
2

A ()  ' (s; )  c  (1  s) l
2
2
+ y:
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Hence,
dCS
dl
=
1
2
q

@
@l
+ ( + l)
@s
@l
  (1  s)

: (43)
We have the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that (; s) ; which are interior solutions to (39) and (40), exist.
(i) s increases in l and  decreases in l if  >  ( + l) and  >  ( + l) : Moreover, if
 > 2 ( + l) ; then consumer surplus decreases in l:
Proof. From (41),
@s
@l
=
1


(1  s)
2
[    ( + l)] +

 
1
2

q

:
Hence, if  >  ( + l) ; then @s
@l
> 0 because  > 12 :
Moreover, from (42),
@
@l
=
1


(1  s)
2
[ ( + l)  ] +

1
2
( + l)  

q

:
Thus, if  >  ( + l) and  >  ( + l) ; then @
@l
< 0:
Finally,
dCS
dl
= :
1
2
q

1


(1  s)
2
h
2 ( + l)      ( + l)2
i
+ [  + ( + l)] q

  (1  s)

If  >  ( + l) and  > 2 ( + l) ; then we have dCS
dl
< 0:
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is similar to that in the main model. Specically, an
increase in l directly increases the marginal benet of improving product safety. However,
when the cross-R&D e¤ect is large ( is relatively large), an increase product safety induces
a decrease in product novelty. When the reduction in product novelty is large it will o¤set
the benet of an increase in product safety and consequently, consumer welfare will decrease.
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